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The Republic of Botswana was formerly the British Protectorate of 
Bechuanaland and subsequently adopted its present name upon independence 
in 1966. The country has had four decades of uninterrupted civilian 
leadership, progressive social policies, and significant capital investment 
creating one of the most dynamic economies in Africa. Mineral extraction, 
principally diamond mining, dominates economic activity, though the tourism 
sector is growing in leaps and bounds possibly due to the country’s 
conservation practices and extensive nature preserves. By the end of 2003, 
Botswana had the world’s highest known rate of HIV/AIDS infection but also 
one of Africa’s most progressive and comprehensive programs for dealing 
with the disease.1 
Geography 
Botswana is located in the southern part of Africa just to the immediate 
north of South Africa. Botswana is a land-locked country of area six hundred 
thousand three hundred and seventy square kilometers (600 370 sq km). The 
landscape is made up of predominantly flat to gently rolling tableland, with 
the Kalahari Desert in the southwest. The climate is semi-arid with warm 
winters and hot summers. 
Amongst the natural resources that can be found in Botswana are 
diamonds, copper, nickel, salt, soda ash, potash, coal, iron ore, and silver. Up 
until the year 2005 it was established that land use in Botswana was split as 
follows:        0.65 per cent was Arable land; 
        0.01 per cent was permanent crops; and 
       99.34 per cent was for others.2 
                                                 
1 The facts and figures on the Republic of Botswana are available on the website of the US Central 
Intelligence Agency at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/index.html 




As at July 2006 the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had established 
that Botswana had a population of one million six hundred and thirty-nine 
thousand eight hundred and thirty-three (1 639 833). In making these 
estimates, the CIA took into account excess mortality due to AIDS which in 
turn can result in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality and death 
rates, lower population and growth rates, and changes in the distribution of 
population by age and sex than would be otherwise expected.3 The CIA 
figures indicate that the prevalence of HIV/AIDS amongst adults was 37.3 per 
cent in 2003, and the number of people living with the disease is shown as 
three hundred and fifty thousand (350 000). In a recent interview with a local 
newspaper, the president of Botswana, Festus Mogae, stated that the overall 
prevalence rate in Botswana is about 17.1 per cent as opposed to the 33 per 
cent reported by the UNAIDS organization.4 He sought to justify this by citing 
that the disparity in the prevalence between different age cohorts, and gave as 
an example, the fact in the 15 to 24 age cohort, the prevalence rate is about 10 
per cent. But notwithstanding this, the President does acknowledge that 
Botswana is seriously affected by the disease and that it should take measures 
to fight the pandemic.   
Economy 
According to the CIA, Botswana has maintained one of the highest growth 
rates since independence in 1966 and, through fiscal discipline and sound 
management, Botswana has transformed itself from one of the poorest 
countries in the world to a middle-income country with per capita GDP of $10 
000 in 2005. The CIA states, further, that two major investment services rank 
Botswana as the best credit risk in Africa. Diamond mining has fueled much 
of the expansion and currently accounts for more than one-third of GDP and 
                                                 
3 Ibid see note 1 
4 The Mmegi Newspaper, Vol.23 No.158 of 20 October 2006 reported the President as having said the 
following: 
‘The figures used by the UN were based on sample surveys on expectant women, who were not 
adequately representative…. And the correct national prevalence rate is about 17.1 per cent.’ 
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for between 70 and 80 per cent of export earnings. Tourism, financial 
services, subsistence farming, and cattle rearing are other key sectors.5  
On the downside, the government must deal with high rates of 
unemployment and poverty. The CIA avers that unemployment is officially 
stated as 23.8 per cent, but unofficial estimates place it closer to 40 per cent. 
The CIA avers, further, that HIV/AIDS infection rates are the second highest 
in the world and threaten Botswana’s impressive economic gains, and that 
long-term prospects are overshadowed by the prospects of a leveling off in 
diamond mining production.  The currency of the Republic of Botswana is 
Pula (BWP) which exchange rates over the past few years have indicated the 
number of Pulas per US dollar as: 5.1104 in 2005; 4.6929 in 2004; 4.9499 in 
2003; 6.3278 in 2002; and 5.8412 in 2001.6 
The following are some of the pertinent economic data, in figures, as 
extrapolated from the CIA website supra: 
 
Economic Trends Value 
GDP purchasing power parity               $17.53 billion (2005 est.) 
 
GDP real growth rate   5.5 per cent 
 (2005 est.) 
 
GDP per capita purchasing power 
parity   








                                                 
5 Ibid see note 1 











2.4 per cent 
46.9 per cent 
(including 36% 
mining) 




Socio-economic Indicators Percentages 
Population below poverty line 30.3 per cent 
 
Inflation rate (consumer prices) 8.6 per cent 
 (2005 est.) 
Unemployment rate 40 per cent 
              (the official rate is 23.8%)  
                          (2004 est.) 
Industrial production growth rate 7.5 per cent 









Trading Patterns Value 
Exports  $3.68 billion f.o.b.       
(2005 est.) 
Exports – commodities: 
Diamonds 
Copper, nickel, soda  





Exports – partners: 
European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) 




87 per cent 
 
7 per cent 
 


















 foodstuffs,  
machinery, electrical goods, transport  
equipment, textiles, fuel and petroleum  
products, wood and paper products, 
metal and  
metal products 
$3.37 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.) 
Imports – partners: 





74 per cent 
 
17 per cent 
4 per cent 
 (2004 est.) 
Debt – external $519 million       
(2005 est.) 
 










The health statistics presented herein were sourced from the Central 
Statistics Office website.7 
As of the year 2003, the number of health facilities in the country were as 
follows: 
Clinics 257 
health posts 336 
mobile stops 761 
 
As of the year 2003 the ratios of medical personnel per 10 000 people in 




The Ministry of Health maintains a disease surveillance system aimed at 
effectively monitoring and controlling outbreaks and spread of diseases of 
epidemic and contagious nature. The five most significant diseases derived 
from this system are malaria (confirmed), measles, rabbies (exposure), viral 
hepatitis, and diarrhoea. 
Statistics show that in the year 2003, ninety-eight thousand four hundred 
and fifty-two (98 452) discharges and ten thousand and sixty-two (10 062) 
deaths were recorded. The leading cause of morbidity registering 8 per cent of 
all causes was AIDS, while the leading cause of mortality was also AIDS, 
accounting for 26.7 per cent of all deaths.  
 




From the above health statistics, it is evident that Botswana has a very 
serious public health problem. This being so as there is a shortage of medical 
personnel (doctors and nurses), which problem is also magnified by the 
exodus of nurses to the United Kingdom, and in terms of the percentage of 
patients that are dying from the HIV/AIDS pandemic. This pandemic will, in 
the not too distant future, have the effect of greatly reducing the life 
expectancy of the country which in turn will have a negative impact on the 
economy of the country as this would mean a loss of productive manpower 
due to the pandemic and therefore reduced productivity in all sectors of the 
economy. 
At present, the government of the Republic of Botswana has been carrying 
out an exercise of providing anti-retroviral medicines to people suffering from 
HIV/AIDS. This much is evident from the 2006 Budget Speech that was 
delivered to the National Assembly by the Minister of Finance and 
Development Planning, Honourable Baledzi Gaolathe when he said the 
following: 
‘Mr Speaker, the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership 
(ACHAP), which is a collaboration between the Government of Botswana, 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation [sic] and Merck Foundation, has 
extended its programme of assistance to Botswana to 2009. In addition, 
the Merck Foundation has agreed to extend donation of their two 
antiretroviral drugs to the Government of Botswana to 2009, and 
Boehringer-Ingelheim’s partnership with Government continues to train 
personnel engaged in the war on AIDS. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria started implementation [sic] of its activities in 
Botswana during 2004 under a grant agreement worth about US$18.6 
million or about BWP100 million to cover assistance to the Non-
Governmental Organisations/Community Based Organisations [sic], and 
 12 
 
the roll-out of the Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission Programme 
[sic].’8  
 It should be noted that these anti-retroviral drugs are very costly to 
acquire (despite the subsidies and donations) and as such it would not be 
economically sustainable for the government to continue with the program in 
the long run. Some of the unpublished figures that I managed to get from the 
outgoing head of the MASA government ARV roll-out program only serve to 
buttress this point.9 In agreeing with the statement made by President Mogae 
in his recent interview,10 Ramotlhwa says that there are currently sixty-four 
thousand (64 000) patients under the government anti-retroviral therapy 
(ART) program and an additional estimated eight thousand seven hundred 
(8700) patients on ART in the private sector. The former government official 
says that, on average, the cost per patient per annum is about five thousand 
Pula (BWP5000), and this cost is inclusive of drugs, laboratory tests, human 
resource, infrastructure, monitoring, evaluation, etc. 
Ramotlhwa avers, further, that ACHAP (the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation and Mreck Company Foundation) has contributed less than 10 per 
cent of the total cost of the roll-out program, and that the cumulative support 
from all partners since the year 2001 was less than 15 per cent as at May 2006 
when he cut his ties with the program. All in all, this serves to show that 
government is carrying the heaviest burden in its fight against AIDS, which, 
in the long run, will make it not to be sustainable and economically feasible 
for it to continue with the roll-out program.   
  
                                                 
8 Budget Speech delivered on the 6th February 2006, available from the Government website 
www.gov.bw/docs/BudgetSpeech2006.pdf, at para 55 on page 13 
9 Mr Segolame Ramotlhwa contributed immensely in the conceptualization of the MASA ARV roll-out 
program. He was involved in the projections for the infrastructure, staffing, and costs of the program. He is 
the recent recipient of the 2006 German Africa Award from the German Africa Foundation, in recognition 
of his efforts in fighting HIV/AIDS to secure peace and health for future generations in Botswana.   
10 Ibid see note 4 
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The diversion of public funds towards the fight against HIV/AIDS will 
also disrupt development in that other sectors of the economy would be by-
passed so that the fight against the pandemic can be funded. At this juncture, 
this is where the negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
become of great consequence to the Republic of Botswana. This is especially 
because it is through negotiations in the WTO that Botswana can bargain for 
favorable conditions in the area of public health with regard to the prices of 
medicines for diseases which afflict her, for example, HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
tuberculosis et al. As such, the Doha Declaration11 was thought to be of great 
importance to the Republic of Botswana and other developing countries. 
Legal commentators believe that the Declaration arose as a result of pressure 
being exerted by African countries on the Council on TRIPs12 before the 











                                                 
11 See the DOHA WTO MINISTERIAL Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health  
WT/MIN(01) 20 November 2001, available from the World Trade Organization website at 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/min01/mindecl_trips_e.htm 
12 The World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
13 See A O Adede, Streamlining Africa’s Responses to the Impact of the TRIPs Agreement, ICTSD, 





THE WTO MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AND ACCESS 
TO MEDICINES 
(i) The DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health 
After constant lobbying by the African group arguing that contrary to the 
principles and objectives of the TRIPs agreement, the then present model on 
intellectual property rights protection was too heavily tilted in favor of right 
holders and against public interest, the African group proposed that there be 
convened a Special Session of the TRIPs Council to address the issues relating 
to the TRIPs agreement, patents, and access to medicines. Adede, in his 
writing,14 says that an allowance for the flexible interpretation of article 31 of 
the TRIPS agreement15 would permit African governments to enact 
appropriate national legislation enabling their people to have access to 
affordable generic aids drugs through ‘compulsory licensing’ or ‘parallel 
importing’. Such an interpretation, the author reasons, would be applied in a 
supportive manner while still retaining its characteristic of being a viable legal 
vehicle for protecting the interests of patent owners. 
Adede avers that from all this lobbying was born the Doha Declaration 
supra which some commentators believe had no legal effect but to interpret 
what was already contained in the TRIPs agreement. However, the author 
maintains that the Doha Declaration had the effect of finally recognizing [in 
an explicit manner] the gravity of the public health crises affecting many 
developing and least-developed countries, particularly with regard to the 
crises emanating from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, etc. 
                                                 
14 Ibid see note 13, at page 15 
15 Article 31 provides for the use of the subject-matter of a patent without the right holder’s authorization, 
including use by the government or third parties authorized by the government. This though, only where 
the national law of the member state permits such compulsory licensing 
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At paragraph 4 of the Declaration, the Ministers agreed that the TRIPS 
Agreement should be interpreted in a flexible and supportive manner by 
saying the following: 
‘[w]e agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, 
while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that 
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all. [My emphasis] 
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the 
full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for 
this purpose.’16 
Adede underscores, further, that moreover, the Declaration explicitly 
affirmed that HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics ‘can 
represent a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency, as 
may be determined by a member state of the WTO, thus triggering the right to 
grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such licenses are granted’. This will then enable the state concerned to 
have access to generic versions of patented drugs which are more affordable.17 
The commentator is of the view that by confining itself to compulsory 
licensing, the Declaration has arguably excluded most African countries from 
its benefits since they do not have local capacity to make use of compulsory 
licensing, unlike say, the bigger developing countries such as India, South 
Africa, and Brazil which all have significant local drug manufacturing 
industries. This is particularly true for Botswana as she has been unable to use 
the flexibilities of the TRIPs agreement to manufacture generic drugs for the 
sole reason of a lack of the necessary capacity. Adede felt, then, that the so-
called ‘breakthrough’ facilitated by the emergence of the Declaration was 
                                                 
16 Ibid see note 11 
17 Ibid see note 11, at para 5 
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somewhat exaggerated. Nonetheless, he did acknowledge that the Declaration 
did prepare the ground for further actions on the matter. Here, he quotes the 
Declaration where it states the following: 
‘We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making 
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We 
instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this 
problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.’18      
As a result of this recognition and acceptance of the problem facing 
developing such as Botswana vis-à-vis capacity constraints, the WTO made a 
follow-up by passing the decision attempting to resolve the dilemma presented 
by paragraph 6 of the Declaration as alluded to herein. 
As a parting shot, on the access to drugs problem, Adede made a few 
recommendations or suggestion of what he thought African policymakers and 
negotiators at the TRIPS Council should push for. Amongst his suggestions 
was that African countries should endeavour to: 
‘… introduce appropriate national legislation to enable African countries 
to take advantage of compulsory licensing or parallel importing, including 
laws against restrictive trade practices in this area (antitrust laws) that 
would together permit the interpretation and application of the TRIPS 
Agreement in a genuinely flexible and supportive manner as recognized 
by the Doha Declaration.’19   
Here, the author was thinking very much ahead of time, and this is backed 
by the fact that it is only now that Botswana and other developing countries 
see the need to enact antitrust laws. However, I do not wish to dwell on this 
point as the topic will be dealt with in my next chapter. 
 
                                                 
18 Ibid see note 11, at para 6 
19 Ibid see note 13, at page 16 
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(ii) Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
As a follow-up to the Doha Declaration, and pursuant to the directive 
therein instructing the Council for TRIPS to ‘find an expeditious solution to this 
problem [of paragraph 6 of the Declaration relating to lack of capacity by 
developing countries] and to report to the General Council …,’20 the August 2003 
Decision was drafted.21 The Decision noted that exceptional circumstances 
existed so as to justify waivers from the obligations22 set out in paragraphs (f) and 
(h) of the TRIPS Agreement23 with respect to pharmaceutical products. In this 
way, developing countries with manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical 
sector, such as India, South Africa, and Brazil, would be able to export generic 
aids drugs to those with no manufacturing capacity such as Botswana. This would 
make for cheaper drugs to be available since competition from generic drugs has 
been shown to have the effect of lowering the prices of patented medicines. This 
was evident where the author Yamey was quoting Justin Forsyth [Oxfam’s 
director of policy] as having said that- 
‘[t]he World Trade Organization must change the rules that the drug 
industry is now using to cripple cheap, local competition, which in turn is 
inflating the cost of new and patented medicines.’ 24 
Yamey cited the example of Indian generic drugs manufacturer, Cipla, 
who had announced that it would be selling triple combination HIV therapy to the 
non-governmental organization (NGO) Medicines without Frontiers for $350 per 
patient per annum, the cost of which to governments would be $600 per patient 
per annum. In response to this, the author says that, five major drug companies 
                                                 
20 Ibid see note 11, at para 6 
21 Decision of the General Council WT/L/540 and Corr.1 of 1 September 2003 Implementation of 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
22 Ibid see note 21, at the fifth pre-ambular paragraph  
23 Ibid see note 15, paragraph (f) of same provides that where a WTO member seeks to issue compulsory 
licenses for the manufacture of generics of patented drugs, such licensing shall be predominantly for the 
supply of the domestic market of that member, whereas, paragraph (h) provides for the remuneration of the 
right holder whom such compulsory license would have been issued over his patented product.  
24 Gavin Yamey, US trade action threatens Brazilian AIDS programme, published in the British Medical 




then promised to cut the costs of their HIV drugs in the developing world, but still 
their prices would have been treble those offered by Cipla. 
On the other hand, the waiver, by the Decision, of the requirement for the 
payment of adequate remuneration as per paragraph (h) of article 31 of TRIPS, 
would enable developing countries manufacturing generic drugs to do so with the 
lesser burden of having to pay hefty royalties to the patent owners. 
(iii) Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement 
On 6 December 2006 WTO members approved changes to the TRIPS 
Agreement making permanent the August 2003 ‘waiver’ supra.25 This 
General Council Decision (hereinafter referred to as the ‘December 2005 
Decision’) is a landmark one in that for the first time, a core WTO agreement 
will be amended. The effect of the December 2005 Decision is to transform 
the August 2003 ‘waiver’ into a permanent amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The WTO press release intimates that the amendment is designed 
such that it will match the 2003 waiver as closely as possible. To this end, 
delegations were involved in intricate legal discussions aimed at ensuring that 
the legal meaning and weight are preserved as exactly as possible.  
 The decision has brought great glee to developing countries and has been 
celebrated extensively. For example, the WTO Director-General [Pascal 
Lamy] is quoted as having said that the agreement to amend the TRIPS 
provisions confirms that members of the WTO multilateral trading system are 
determined to ensure that the system contributes to the humanitarian and 
development goals of the organization. Mr Lamy stated, further, that the 
decision gives him personal gratification as for a number of years, he had been 
involved in work geared towards ensuring that the TRIPS Agreement is part 
of the solution to the problem of ensuring that the poor have access to 
medicines.26 
                                                 
25 WTO: 2005 Press Releases Press/426 of 6 December 2005 on Intellectual Property, available at 
www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm 
26 Ibid see note 25, at para 5 
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Also celebrating the decision was Kenyan Ambassador Amina Mohamed, 
the chair of the WTO General Council. She has been quoted as having said 
that the main benefit of the decision is to ensure that the African nations have 
access to affordable medicines and that they are able to drive the price of the 
pharmaceuticals to an even lower level.27 
Regarding the fear that the decision might be abused to undermine patent 
protection, the chair had soothing words designed to allay these fears. She 
alluded to the fact the members had a common understanding on how the 
decision was to be interpreted and implemented. She reiterated, also, that the 
decision would be used in good faith in order to deal with public health 
problems and not for industrial or commercial objectives, and that issues such 
as preventing the medicines getting into the wrong hands would be afforded 
the importance they deserve. 
 I have a feeling, however, that this is easier said than done as, in practice, 
there will always be that unscrupulous element in society which is bent on 
making a quick buck by any means necessary. As such, there will have to be 
strict measures in place to deal with those who will violate the provisions of 
the decision. 
It should be pointed out at this stage that it is not all rosy and plain-sailing 
in that there are still those who are sceptical about the ability of the decision to 
work out as smoothly as planned. For instance, Ellen ‘t Hoen [the coordinator 
of the Globalisation Project of the Access to Essential Medicines Campaign of 
Me`decins Sans Frontieres (MSF)] had earlier criticised the August 2003 
waiver as being ‘overly cumbersome and inefficient’. She said that there was 
no experience of the mechanism being used and that not a single patient had 
benefited from its use despite the fact that newer medicines, such as second-
line AIDS drugs, were priced out of reach of poor patients.28 As such, it will 
                                                 
27 Gustavo Capdevila, TRADE: Activists Take Issue with WTO Decision on Cheap Drugs, published on 7 
December 2005 on the Inter Press Service News Agency website, at 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31330  
28 Ibid see note 27 
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be paramount for members to find a way of transforming what is good, on 
paper, to actual provision of affordable drugs to the masses in the developing 
world. 
‘t Hoen complained, further, that MST is already experiencing what she 
termed a ‘steep increase’ in their projects. She stated that they pay between 5 
and 30 times more for second-line AIDS drugs to treat patients who need 
newer drugs due to the emergence of resistant strains of the disease.29  
(iv) Implications of the TRIPS-related Developments in the Rest of 
the World 
The Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network in its paper30 observed that as at 
present, India, Brazil and Thailand have been among the biggest generic 
producers of AIDS drugs, both for their own domestic consumption and for 
export. It alleges, further, that this production has been helpful in making 
AIDS drugs available to developing countries at affordable prices, and that 
competition created by these generics had the effect of reducing the price of 
many drugs from as much as US$15 000 per annum per person for a course of 
combination treatment to as little as US$150 per annum per person. This 
serves only to buttress more the point made earlier on the effect of generic 
competition on the price of drugs. 
The paper singles out a few examples of how the new developments 
related to the TRIPS Agreement will affect the price and consequently 
availability of drugs for developing countries. The point of departure here is 
Indian law which in the period before 1 January 2005 did not recognize 
patents, thus allowing for the manufacture of generic drugs by companies in 
her pharmaceutical industry.31 Thereafter, India’s transition period to adapt to 
the TRIPS Agreement came to an end and the Indian parliament, in March 
2005, passed laws amending their Patent Act to make it compatible with 
                                                 
29 Ibid see note 27 
30 Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Intellectual Property and Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment Case 
Studies, published on 1 August 2006 
31 Ibid see note 30 at page 1 
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TRIPS. The Canadian paper supra highlights the point that for first-line drugs 
that were already in the public domain pre-1995, Indian manufacturers can 
continue making generics of same. However, for second-line drugs which 
were manufactured after the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995, 
for Indian companies to produce generics of same, they will need a 
compulsory license or similar authorization.  
The paper stresses that without the necessary authorization to make the 
production of generics legal, the price of drugs will be the monopoly price that 
the patent owners can charge, in view of the absence of competition from 
generic drugs. It is also averred here that these second-line drugs are nearly 10 
times more expensive than first-line drugs, and will be increasingly needed as 
resistance to the first-line drugs emerges. It is argued, further, that in addition 
to the procedural hurdles and uncertainty under the new rules on compulsory 
licensing, the issuing of such licenses by developing country governments will 
be made difficult by the inevitable political and economic pressures exerted 
by both brand-name pharmaceutical companies and countries like the US 
seeking to protect the interests of their industries. An example of this was 
cited by the author James Love in his article32 where the US government 
embarked on the use of economic threats to force the Government of South 
Africa to amend its proposed Medicines and Related Substances Act which 
was aimed at promoting the availability of more affordable AIDS drugs via 
parallel imports and compulsory licensing. This, the author says, came in the 
form of the US cutting aid to South Africa in 1998 followed by the denial of 
tariff breaks on exports later in the same year, and, finally, placing South 
Africa on the ‘watch list’ in 1999.    
The paper closes by saying that India is but one important example of how 
implementing TRIPS was likely to restrict existing sources of supply for 
lower-cost generic drugs that many developing countries like Botswana need 
to import. In this way, the paper emphasises that even those countries that are 
                                                 
32 Notes on the USTR watch Lists and Reports, published in 1999 and available at http://cptech.org 
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not yet required to make their legislation compatible with TRIPS will feel the 
pinch if they need to import generic drugs from countries such as India where 
compulsory licensing is now required in order to export in any significant 
quantity. 
Next, the paper looked at the example of Brazil whose government 
responded to the HIV/AIDS scourge in a manner that is now considered a 
model program in that it provided free treatment to [as at 1 August 2006] one 
hundred and sixty thousand (160 000) patients. This was made possible by 
Brazil’s capacity to manufacture generic AIDS drugs, particularly first-line 
drugs which were developed before Brazilian law was amended in 1996 to 
make it TRIPS compatible by recognizing patents.33 However, it is conceded 
that the problem vis a vis second-line drugs alluded to with regards to India is 
equally applicable here. 
As a further example of how competition from generic drugs can cause a 
drop in prices of branded drugs, the authors cite the example of the ARV 
Kaletra (lopinavir + ritonavir), made by the US-based multinational Abbot 
Laboratories who, in 2005, was forced to drop the price of the said drug. This 
the Brazilian government achieved by issuing a threat to the US company to 
drop its price or face compulsory licensing of its patented product so that it 
could be distributed domestically and at a cheaper price. Abbot eventually 
relented and agreed to fix a lower price for a period of 6 years in exchange for 
Brazil agreeing to forego using generics or seeking further price reductions. 
The authors look at the impact of the amendments to TRIPS from the 
point of view, also, of developed or high-income countries. The paper 
acknowledges the positive steps taken by the EU and Canada in an attempt to 
abide by the 2003 waiver and the 2005 decision supra. However, they are 
quick to point out the double-standards being applied by the US in an effort to 
protect its pharmaceutical industry. In this way, the authors say that ‘countries 
that have tried to limit or balance patents with other public policy goals such 
                                                 
33 Ibid see note 30, at page 2 
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as access to medicines inevitably run into opposition from the US as well as 
other rich nations where powerful drug companies are based.’34 
The paper states, further, that the US’s common objectives in concluding 
free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries are to ‘limit the potential 
exclusions from patentability, to prevent parallel importation, and to limit the 
grounds on which compulsory licensing may be granted (such as allowing it 
only in “emergency” situations)’. 
In addition, the authors say that the US negotiates for ‘data exclusivity’ 
provisions which prevent any use of scientific data submitted by the original 
patent-holder in getting market approval. This would entail more burden and 
expense on the manufacturers of generic drugs in that they would now have to 
carry out scientific tests to come up with their own data. This is, arguably, 
running counter to what the 2003 waiver and the 2005 decision had intended. 
As an example, the authors here cite the on-going negotiations on the US-
Thailand FTA.35 Here, they aver that rules on ‘data exclusivity’ would require 
generic drug manufacturers to conduct their own clinical trials of the safety 
and efficacy of their ‘new’ drugs, rather than being able to use data submitted 
by the brand-name companies. 
In conclusion, the authors point out a few important things pertaining to 
the accessibility and affordability under the TRIPS Agreement vis that: 
(a) the recent developments in India, Brazil and Thailand illustrate how 
access to lower-cost generic drugs could become even more difficult in 
future; 
(b) the WTO waiver of 2003 and decision of December 2005, ostensibly 
aimed at loosening the TRIPS patent rules to help secure access to 
medicines, are untested as yet and will be worth little if no further 
action is taken; 
                                                 
34 Ibid see note 30, at page 4 
35 Ibid see note 30, at page 3 
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(c) new bi-lateral and multilateral trade agreements that impose ‘TRIPS-
plus’ restrictions must be rejected; 
(d) governments must be willing to use compulsory licensing to secure 
lower-cost medicines for patients in their own countries and abroad, 
and make the necessary legislative changes that may be required in 
their domestic law; 
(e) for those countries [such as Botswana] without domestic capacity to 
manufacture generics, it is important that supplier countries adopt 
legislation to allow easy compulsory licensing for export, learning 
from and improving upon models such as the legal reforms adopted in 
India and other jurisdictions.36 
Basing on the above, only time will tell whether the TRIPS Agreement 
can deliver medicines to those afflicted by AIDS in Botswana and other 
developing countries. In the meantime, however, we would do well to look at 
other avenues of making drugs accessible at affordable prices. In this direction 
I would now like to turn my attention to antitrust or competition law. The 
Republic of Botswana currently has no legislation on competition. However, 
in August of 2005, the Botswana Parliament approved the National 
Competition Policy for Botswana whose main objective is to prevent and 
redress any anti-competitive practices and conduct by firms, to encourage 
competition and the efficient use of resources, to promote investment, and to 
broaden choices and stabilise prices.37 A Competition Bill is currently being 














                                                 
36 Ibid see note 30 at page 5 
37 National Competition Policy for Botswana, published by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in July 





INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND COMPETITION LAW 
The one thing that the Botswana competition law will have to take into 
account is the interface between intellectual property rights and competition 
law. This is very important especially with regard to the issue of 
pharmaceutical products and the patents held by the big multinational 
companies over them. Lawrence Reyburn, in his writing,38 acknowledges this 
interface. He says that it is often claimed that there is an inherent conflict 
between the anti-monopoly bias of the competition system and what is 
perceived as a pro-monopoly bias of the intellectual property system. If this is 
the case, then it is implied that there has to be a yielding of ground by one 
where the other can assert primacy. 
However, the author goes on to say that there is another level where the 
two, competition law and intellectual property rights, can co-exist in a manner 
that is complementary to one another in promoting economic efficiency and 
hence, ultimately, public wellbeing. Viewed from this angle, the author states 
that competition law should recognise and acknowledge the legitimate ambit 
of intellectual property rights, and that they embody economic and legal 
powers which are natural and healthy in an active and efficient economy, in 
the same way that monopolies which arise from superior efficiency and not 
from abuse of power are seen as legitimate in competition theory. This is a 
given as will be illustrated throughout the course of this paper, the essence of 
which is to buttress the point that monopolies are well and good as long as 
they do not establish market power which may breed abuse of dominance 
which is proscribed by section 8 of the South African Act.39 
                                                 
38 Lawrence Reyburn, Competition Law of South Africa, at Chapter 11 “Interface with Intellectual 
Property”, last updated by Philip Sutherland on 31 August 2004  
39 The Competition Act of 1998 
 26 
 
This point is also supported by the Competition Commission of South 
Africa, in its publication,40 where it is said that both intellectual property laws 
and competition law have the same aim, that of the advancement of society 
and consumer choice. The Commission makes the point that intellectual 
property rights are granted to afford the owners the opportunity to recoup their 
innovation costs, and therefore have a pro-competitive benefit of keeping the 
market for innovation profitable and alive. The Commission states, further, 
that competition authorities will usually approach cases where there is an 
interface between intellectual property rights and competition law with a 
distinct competitive bias in favour of the owner of the intellectual property 
right. The precursor to this is that this does not mean that the anticompetitive 
effect of the exercise of an intellectual property right may not be found to 
outweigh the pro-competitive gains from granting intellectual property rights. 
This is the point at which the competition authorities should intervene. On a 
personal note, I feel that as an addition to this there should be lee-way to allow 
for the authorities in a particular country to act in the preservation of life as a 
matter of public policy. I will endeavour to deal with this argument in greater 
detail in the Chapter Three on ‘Accessibility and Affordability – the Reach of 
Competition Law’. 
The two writings [those of Reyburn and the Competition Commission of 
South Africa] alluded to in this part of my paper are agreed on the fact that 
interfaces between intellectual property and competition law, to a large extent, 
take place within the scope of licensing agreements where the owner of the 
intellectual property licenses the right to use the intellectual property to 
licensees under certain conditions. This aspect I will deal with in more detail 
further into my paper as it is very important to developing countries vis a vis 
getting affordable antiretroviral drugs from big multinational patent owners or 
alternatively from generic drug manufacturers who will require licenses to 
come up with the required cheaper drugs. The Commission makes an 
                                                 




important observation to the effect that these licenses will invariably include 
such conditions as output constraints and market sharing which would raise 
the concern of competition authorities. The Commission says that licensing is 
widely regarded as very pro-competitive. This, they say is so as further 
improvements can be made to the technology and thus leading to further 
innovation taking place. This issue of licensing, as will be seen in this paper, 
is not as straight forward as one would think. It brings with it other ancillary 
matters such as refusal to deal, the essential facilities doctrine, and voluntary 
issuing of licenses. There are various presumptions relating to the intellectual 
property owner’s extent and reach of his implementation of his rights as will 
be illustrated when analysing the decided cases in the United States of 
America (US) and the European Union (EU). Also addressed will be the 
question whether these presumptions can be rebutted and if so, upon 
presentation of what kind of evidence. This comparative analysis of laws in 
different jurisdictions will go a long way in assisting Botswana and other 
developing countries in terms of adopting the good practices in drafting her 
competition legislation by looking at the experiences of others. 
Reyburn made a point to the effect that one short-coming of the South 
African Act is that it does not make sufficient recognition of intellectual 
property rights. He observed that the only express recognition of intellectual 
property rights is contained in s10 (4) dealing with exemptions from the 
general prohibitions regarding restrictive and abusive conduct.41 No inkling is 
given in s10 of the principles which should be applied when applications 
regarding intellectual property rights are considered. Botswana and other 
developing countries should be wary of this and do all they can to avoid this 
                                                 
41 S10 (4) specifically reads as follows: 
 
‘A firm may apply to the Competition Commission to exempt from the application of this chapter 
[Chapter 2:  Prohibited Practices] an agreement or practice, or category of agreements or practices, 
that relates to the exercise of intellectual property rights, including a right acquired or protected in 
terms of the Performers’ Protection Act, 1967 (Act No. 11 of 1967), the Plant Breeders’ Rights 
Act, 1976 (Act No. 15 of 1976), the Patents Act, 1978 (Act No. 57 of 1978), the Copyright Act, 
1978 (Act No. 98 of 1978), the Trade Marks Act, 1993 (Act No. 194 of 1993) and the Designs 
Act, 1993 (Act No. 195 of 1993).’ 
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pitfall. The Commission, on the other hand, carried out research on other 
jurisdictions’ approaches to the interface between intellectual property rights 
and competition law in order to establish a framework for consistent 
competition analysis in the case of such an interface. It was found that in the 
case of the two jurisdictions evaluated vis Canada and the US, both have 
comprehensive guidelines on how to assess cases with the said interface. 
The US Department of Justice: Antitrust Division and Federal Trade 
Commission (being the US agencies) jointly issued guidelines with respect to 
the licensing of intellectual property. The guidelines state that standard 
antitrust analysis applies to intellectual property, and that intellectual property 
is no more or less subject to scrutiny from antitrust agencies than any other 
property. This is a great stride taken in the direction of recognising intellectual 
property rights in the US antitrust laws. 
I will endeavour to deal with the Canadian guidelines in much more depth 
than I did with the US ones.42 The Commission document avers to the fact 
that the Canadian guidelines stress the earlier highlighted point that 
competition law and intellectual property rights are both necessary for the 
efficient operation of the marketplace, as both wish to achieve a similar aim 
vis that of promoting a competitive marketplace. The Commission document 
highlights the fact that under the general provisions of the Canadian 
Competition Act, the mere exercise of an intellectual property right is no 
cause for concern as the unilateral exercise of the intellectual property right to 
exclude does not violate the provisions of the Act – no matter to what degree 
competition is affected. However, it is brought to note that the Bureau does 
apply the general provisions when intellectual property forms the basis of 
arrangements between otherwise independent entities, to use or enforce 
intellectual property rights when the alleged competitive harm stems from 
such an arrangement and not from the exercise of the intellectual property 
right. I fail to understand the wisdom in this reasoning in that had the 
                                                 
42 The Canadian Competition Bureau released their Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines in 2000 
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complained of act been perpetrated by an individual it would not have been 
unlawful, but just that there would have been collusion in perpetrating the 
same act makes it unlawful. 
The Commission document states that the Bureau’s approach is that the 
mere exercise of an intellectual property right is not an anticompetitive act, 
but it acknowledges that there is a possibility that under very rare 
circumstances,43 the mere exercise of an intellectual property right may raise 
competition concerns. Section 32 of the Canadian Act requires that certain 
circumstances be met and that, inter alia, the competitive harm should follow 
from the refusal to license. Should the requirements be met, the Federal Court 
is to balance the interest of the system of protection of intellectual property 
and the incentives created by it against the public interest in the market under 
consideration and competition in general. This is one paramount consideration 
that Botswana should take into account when drafting her competition law so 
as to avoid future confusion and authorities or courts arriving at varying 
decisions over cases with more or less similar facts. In reaching the above 
conclusion, it is said that the Bureau should have first determined that the 
holder of the intellectual property is dominant in the relevant market and that 
the intellectual property is an essential input, and that the refusal to license 
prevents competition in the relevant market. Secondly, the Bureau should 
have been satisfied that the refusal to license has a stifling effect on further 
innovation and that by invoking a special remedy against the intellectual 
property right holder, the incentive to invest in innovative markets will not be 
adversely affected. 
The Commission document states that the approach followed by the 
Canadian Competition Bureau seems applicable to the South African 
legislative and economic circumstances. The document goes further to say 
that the methodology followed does not differ from the one that is the 
standard competition analysis implemented by the Competition Commission 
                                                 
43 As set out in s32 of the Canadian Competition Act (2001) 
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and thus the approach could be implemented with success in the South 
African situation. I don’t know whether this is synonymous with a call for the 
South African Act to be amended in line therewith. However, since it is felt 
that this is the best practice, then it would be advisable for Botswana to adopt 
same after having made the necessary legislative and economic analysis of the 
prevailing situation in Botswana. The document supra listed the following as 
some of the principles the Commission in South Africa would consider when 
analysing a situation with an interface between intellectual property rights and 
competition law: 
‘1.   Competition law should recognise the basic rights granted 
under intellectual property law. The creation and 
maintenance of innovation markets are necessary for 
economic progress and development; 
2. Intellectual property does not necessarily create market power; 
3. A practice involving intellectual property should not be 
prohibited if the practice leads to a less anticompetitive 
situation than without the said practice; and 
4. The long-term pro-competitive benefits should outweigh the 
short-term “anti-competitive” effects of intellectual property 
rights.’ 
I deem it necessary to touch on this important point of when an interface 
between intellectual property rights and competition law would justify 
interference by the competition authority as the latter part of my paper will be 
based on licensing vis a vis the protection of patents held by multinational 
companies over antiretroviral drugs and how competition law can be used to deal 
with same and how this can lead to a reduction of prices of aids medicines which 
in turn will lead to accessibility of the said medicines in Botswana and other 





ACCESSIBILITY AND AFFORDABILITY – THE REACH OF 
COMPETIOTION LAW 
It is very important to make a detailed analysis of how effective 
enforcement and strong competition advocacy can positively impact the access to 
drugs for the poor in Botswana and other developing countries in a similar 
predicament vis a vis the HIV/AIDS pandemic. On this note I will endeavour to 
use the South African, Brazilian, and Indian examples to see how competition law 
was used to positively influence pharmaceutical companies to make aids drugs 
accessible to the poor at reasonable prices. 
(i) The case of Hazel Tau and Others vs GlaxoSmithKline South Africa (Pty) Ltd and 
Boehringer Ingelheim (Pty) Ltd  
According to the complainant’s statement of complaint,44 the basis of the 
complaint was threefold as will be demonstrated shortly. I would first like to 
introduce the respondents in the complaint vis GlaxoSmithKline (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘GSK’) and Boehringer Ingelheim (hereinafter referred to as ‘BI’). 
GSK is a company duly incorporated under the laws of South Africa and was 
cited because to the best of the complainants’ knowledge it had and exercised the 
exclusive right to market and sell GlaxoSmithKline antiretroviral medicines 
(ARVs) in South Africa, as the South African representative of the 
GlaxoSmithKline group of companies. GSK had the exclusive right to market and 
sell the following ARVs in South Africa: 
(a)      Zidovudine (AZT), branded as Retrovir®; 
(b) Lamivudine, branded as 3TC®; 
(c) Abacavir (ABC), branded as Ziagen®; 
(d) Amprenavir, branded as Preclir®; 
(e) AZT/lamivudine, branded as Combivir®; and 
(f) AZT/lamivudine/ABC, branded as Trizivir®. 
                                                 
44 Statement of Complaint in Terms of Section 49B(2)(b) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, which is 
available from the website of the Treatment Action Campaign at www.tac.org.za 
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BI was also a company registered under the laws of South Africa, and 
which, to the best of the complainants’ knowledge, had the exclusive right to 
market and sell the ARV nevirapine—branded as Viramune®—in South Africa. 
BI was a South African operation of the CH Boehringer group which is a 
research-based group of pharmaceutical companies headquartered in Ingelheim, 
Germany. It was important that the complainants chose to initiate proceedings 
against these two companies as AZT, lamivudine, and nevirapine were the 
commonly used ARVs as part of the same triple-drug regimen.45 The 
complainants’ focus was on GSK and BI because the two companies not only 
charged much higher prices than generic drug manufacturing companies, but also 
vigorously enforced their patent rights in South Africa. 
The particulars of the complaint were, first and most important, that 
respondents had engaged in excessive pricing of ARVs to the detriment of 
consumers, as prohibited by s8(a) of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998,46 and that 
the excessive pricing of ARVs was directly responsible for the premature, 
predictable and avoidable deaths of people living with HIV/AIDS, including both 
children and adults. 
Secondly, the complainants alleged that in so far as the ARVs were 
concerned, the respondents were dominant firms as contemplated by s7 of the 
Act.47 In the result, the prohibition in the Act against excessive pricing to the 
detriment of consumers is applicable. The relevant markets in which dominance is 
alleged are detailed below.    
Lastly, the complainants alleged that the respondents satisfied the 
threshold requirements in s6 of the Act48 in that in the 2002 financial year, the 
gross revenue of each of the respondents from income in, into or from South 
                                                 
45 As per document released by the TAC in 2003 titled: ‘Reducing the Prices of Anti-retroviral Medicines 
Answers to Frequently asked Questions’ and which is available at www.tac.org.za 
46 Section 8(a) reads: ‘ It is prohibited for a dominant firm to –  
 (a) charge an excessive price to the detriment of consumers; …’ 
47 Section 7 states that a firm is dominant in a market if it has at least 45% of that market, or if it has at least 
35%, but less than 45%, of that market unless it can show that it does not have market power, or if it has 
less than 35% of that market but has market power. 
48 Section 6 provides inter alia for the Minister of Trade and Industry to determine a threshold of annual 
turnover or assets below which Part B of the Act on ‘Abuse of Dominant Position’ would not apply. 
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Africa, arising from the transactions set out in item 3(1) of the Schedule to the 
Determination of Threshold in terms of s6(1) of the Act, had exceeded the 
threshold of ZAR 5 million as contained in Government Notice 562 in 
Government Gazette 22128 dated 9 March 2001. 
Following every complaint there has to be relief sought, and in this 
particular case the complainants sought relief in the following terms49 in 
accordance with the provisions of the Competition Act: 
(i) That after investigation in due course, the Commission refer the 
complaint to the Competition Tribunal in terms of s50(2)(a) of the 
Act;50 
(ii) that, upon a finding of the existence of a prohibited practice in 
terms of the express provisions of s8 of the Act supra, the Tribunal 
order that the excessive pricing practice cease with immediate 
effect by virtue of the power granted it by s58(1)(a)(i) of the Act;51 
(iii) that the Tribunal declare the respondents’ conduct a prohibited 
practice for purposes of damages claims by all persons who can 
establish that they have suffered loss or damage as a result of the 
prohibited practice concerned in terms of s58(1)(a)(v)52 read with 
s65of the Act;53 and 
(iv) that the Tribunal impose an administrative penalty, on GSK and 
BI, of up to 10 per cent of their annual South African turnover in 
accordance with s58(1)(a)(iii)54 as read with s59 of the Act. 
On 16 October 2003, the Competition Commission announced that they 
had decided to refer the complaint to the Competition Tribunal. They released 
a press statement stating that GSK and BI had contravened the Competition 
                                                 
49 This was contained in paragraph 103 et al of the complainants’ Statement supra see note 12 
50 Section 50(2)(a) is to the effect that the Commission must, within one year of its receipt of a complaint, 
refer a complaint to the Competition Tribunal if it determines that a prohibited practice has been 
established. 
51 Section 58(1)(a)(i) gives the Tribunal power to issue an order interdicting any prohibited practice. 
52 Section 58(1)(a)(v) gives the Tribunal power to issue an order declaring the conduct of a firm a 
prohibited practice for the purposes of s65 of the Act. 
53 Section 65 makes provision for the need for other courts to refer competition law issues to the Tribunal 
before dealing with the merits thereto. This is particularly important for litigants who may want to sue for 
damages based on claims arising from breaches of the Competition Act. 
54 Section 58(1)(a)(iii) empowers the Tribunal to issue administrative penalties pursuant to s59 of the Act. 
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Act of 1998 by abusing their dominant positions in the market. The 
Commission found that GSK and BI had engaged in the following forms of 
prohibited conduct: 
(a) Excessive pricing to the detriment of consumers;  
(b) Denying a competitor access to an essential facility; and  
(c) Engaging in an exclusionary act.55  
  The Commission's findings went beyond the original complaint. The 
initial complaint only asked the Commission to find that the drug companies 
had engaged in excessive pricing. The Commission had investigated the 
complaint and found evidence to support the referral to the Competition 
Tribunal on these two additional grounds, both of which dealt with the failure 
of GSK and BI to give licenses to generic manufacturers.   
The Commission had decided to ask the Competition Tribunal to license 
generic competitors. By opening up the market to generic competition, the 
Tribunal would have ensured that people in South Africa got access to a 
sustainable supply of affordable ARVs. 
The TAC paper seeks to stress the point that it is important to understand 
that these were merely findings of the Competition Commission after its 
yearlong investigations, and that they were not legal rulings. It is the role of 
the Competition Tribunal to make orders against GSK and BI if, after hearing 
arguments and considering the evidence, it concluded that the Competition 
Commission's findings were correct. 
Nevertheless, the Competition Commission’s findings were significant, as 
they eventually put pressure on GSK and BI to lower their prices and to give 
licenses to generic manufacturers.  
It is such a pity (especially for students of law), depending on which way 
you look at it, that the case did not go all the way to be heard by the Tribunal 
as a settlement was reached between the complainants and the pharmaceutical 
companies whereby the two companies issued voluntary licenses to a 
manufacturer of generic drugs (Aspen) for it to use the two companies’ 
patents to come up with generic medicines. The conditions of the licenses, 




                                                 
55 Ibid  see note 45 
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On the same day that the Competition Commission announced that it 
would refer the matter to the Tribunal, GSK extended its licensing agreement 
with Aspen such that the latter could sell their AZT and lamivudine products 
to the private sector and also export the medicines to all countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. The TAC observed in addition that, GSK reduced its ARV 
drug prices to the public sector, NGOs and companies providing medicines to 
their employees.  However, their private sector prices remained excessive. 
Of concern, however, was that neither GSK nor BI had yet allowed any 
other generic company to have a license to produce or import generic ARVs. 
In addition, neither GSK nor BI had indicated that they were prepared to do 
so. The TAC felt that this was problematic for three reasons vis: 
‘(a) that more generic companies were urgently needed to ensure proper 
competition among drug companies. Only proper competition 
would ensure that drug prices reached their lowest possible amount 
and would stay there; 
(b) at least two generic companies produced a single pill containing three 
ARVs. This was very important because patients could then take one 
pill twice a day instead of many pills. This had been shown to improve 
adherence to medicines and ultimately patient health. However, since 
all the ARVs that were in the pill (which happened to be d4T, 
lamivudine and nevirapine) were patented in South Africa, the generic 
companies could not legally sell the medicines in South Africa unless 
they got licenses to do so. Until that point, only one company (BMS) 
had agreed not to enforce its rights in its patented ARVs, one of which 
was d4T. But until GSK did the same (or grants licenses to generic 
companies) for lamivudine, and BI the same for nevirapine, this 
important combination ARV drug could not be sold in South Africa; 
and 
(c) the TAC made a further observation that at least one generic company 
produced another combination pill containing three ARVs (AZT, 
lamivudine and nevirapine). But the company could not sell this 
important pill in South Africa until such a time that it got a license to 
do so.’56   
Of great interest to me is the findings made by the Commission and 
how they would lead to a more permanent and sustainable solution. All we 
can do for now is to ponder as to how the Tribunal would have dealt with 
the issues. I will endeavor to address the issues next by making a 
comparative analysis with decided cases in the US and Europe.  
                                                 
56 Ibid see note 45 
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 (ii) The Issue of Denying a Competitor Access to an Essential Facility  
As earlier alluded to, it is unfortunate that the South African case of Hazel 
Tau supra did not go before the Tribunal for determination of the issue whether 
intellectual property, in South African jurisprudence, can be said to amount to 
an essential facility in terms of the Act which prohibits a dominant firm from 
refusing to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is 
economically feasible to do so.57 The Act defines an essential facility at 
s1(1)(viii) under CHAPTER 1 ‘DEFINITIONS, INTERPRETATION, 
PURPOSE AND APPLICATION OF ACT’.58  
  The question for determination now is whether intellectual property can be 
said to be an ‘infrastructure or resource’ as intended by the wording of the Act. I 
will attempt to answer this question by looking at the comparative jurisprudence 
of decided cases in South Africa, Europe, and the US. This so as to see whether 
the Botswana courts would be justified or not in deciding the issue, whichever 
way they may determine it. It has been said by some legal commentators that 
under the essential facilities doctrine, ‘the monopoly owner of an “essential 
facility” for competition may be forced to give access to that facility to 
competitors on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms’.59 
  The authors went on to analyse a few decided US cases on the essential 
facilities doctrine and came to the conclusion that in each of the cases the 
defendant owned a facility that could not feasibly be duplicated, and also 
participated in a competitive downstream market that required access to the 
facility. From this it is clear that the doctrine can only be used in the case of a 
plaintiff who is in the relevant market in competition with the owner of the 
facility.60 As such, it is not clear how in the case of a small developing country 
like Botswana, where there are no companies with the requisite capacity to 
manufacture generic ARVs, the doctrine will be of use. Unless the government 
takes positive steps to assist entrepreneurs in the form of public private 
partnerships (PPPs) whereby they will engage in a joint-venture to get the 
                                                 
57 Ibid see note 46, at s8(b) of the Act 
58  Section 1(1)(viii) states thus - ‘essential facility means an infrastructure or resource that cannot 
reasonably be duplicated, and without access to which competitors cannot reasonably provide goods or 
services to their customers;’ 
59 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, & Mark A. Lemley in their article, UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO 
License, published in the Journal of Competition Law and Economics on 24vFebruary 2006 
60 See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp. 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) at 1356-59 
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process of manufacturing started, I see the reach of competition law being 
compromised where it would have been of great assistance. 
  (a) Going back to the US cases, the authors cited examples of the 
cases of Terminal Railroad,61 Otter Tail,62 and MCI.63 In Terminal Railroad, the 
facility owned was a key bridge over the Mississipi River and accompanying 
rail yard which the owners, a group of railroads, refused to give competing 
railroads use of the facility. In Otter Tail, the facility in issue was transmission 
lines into a municipality which the owner public utility refused to allow the 
municipality to ‘wheel’ power over those lines from outside plants because the 
utility itself wanted to provide power to the municipality. Lastly, in MCI the 
pre-breakup Bell System refused to permit MCI to connect its long-distance 
calls to the Bell System’s local phone exchanges. In this latter case the court 
formulated a four-part test for an essential facilities claim which, if made out, 
the defendant will be compelled to provide access to the facility on reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms. The court laid down the test as follows: 
‘(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 
 (2) a competitor’s inability to duplicate the essential facility;  
 (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 
 (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.’64 
  The authors note that the test also offers a defence of legitimate business 
justification by permitting the defendant to show that it was not feasible to 
provide access to the facility. In this way, I would suppose, the pharmaceutical 
companies in the case of South Africa, Botswana and other developing 
countries would have to adduce tangible evidence of same, for instance, in the 
form of balance sheets showing, for example, that in light of the investment they 
would have made in research and development, it would not be economically 
feasible for them to avail the essential facility (in the present case being the 
patented formulae involved in manufacturing their ARVs) to their competitors, 
                                                 
61 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) 
62 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) 
63 MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983) 
64 Ibid see note 63, at pages 1132-33 
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being the manufacturers of generic medicines. 
  The authors view it important to add that, though the court in MCI and 
Otter Tail did not address the issue directly, withholding an essential facility is 
illegal only if it has the undesirable effect of foreclosing competition in the 
downstream market, and therefore of helping the defendant to acquire and 
maintain a monopoly in that market. This seems to imply that the claimant in an 
essential facilities claim would have the further onus of proving that failure or 
refusal by the owner to avail him the facility would lead to his not being able to 
continue business and therefore having a net negative effect on competition. 
  In closing on the US position, the authors express the view that the 
doctrine is dead in the US since the Supreme Court, in Trinko, distanced itself 
from the doctrine by claiming that it had ‘never recognized such a doctrine’.65 
This US approach was reiterated by Harry First who, though conceding that 
intellectual property is now seen as essentially similar to tangible property, 
stressed that the ‘inherent goods’ aspect of intellectual property makes it prone 
to free riding leading to rights holders arguing that stronger protection is needed 
to achieve adequate returns and optimal levels of innovation.66 This approach of 
developed countries runs parallel to what developing countries would like, vis, 
having a less stringent intellectual property rights regime. First went on to state 
that ‘indeed the Supreme Court in Trinko accepts the idea that owners of 
monopolies should be given strong protection so as to promote innovation and 
allow maximum returns, because the opportunity to charge monopoly prices, at 
least in the short term is what attracts business acumen in the first place’. This 
line of thinking is hardly surprising coming from the land of free enterprise 
where profit maximization is the order of the day. Not to say that one can climb 
the moral high ground and seek to vilify the pharmaceutical companies for 
pricing their products excessively, after all they are in business to make profit. 
However, looking at the precarious position that Botswana and other developing 
                                                 
65 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) 
66 Contributions to discussions at the ‘ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: DUTIES TO 
LICENSE, PARALLEL IMPORTS AND THE QUESTION OF DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ Post-Fordham International Competition Policy Conference Saturday, 
October 3, 2004  
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countries find themselves in vis a vis the aids pandemic, from the point of view 
of care for humanity and the preservation of life, it would be wise to enact 
competition law that would take into account emergency situations which would 
give the competition authorities power to intervene and order that the 
pharmaceutical companies give licenses to manufacturers of generic drugs or 
allow for the importation of generic medicines from other developing countries 
with the capacity to manufacture same. However, a precursor to such a 
provision would have to be that it should not be left wide-open so as to invite its 
abuse by unscrupulous governments. It should be construed in a very narrow or 
restricted sense so as to guard against its abuse to the detriment of 
manufacturers of medicines.  
  The authors say that they are not aware of any case in which a US court 
has held that an intellectual property right was itself an essential facility that 
must be licensed on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. They state further 
that although the cases present the issue, none of the courts directly addresses 
the issue of whether an intellectual property right can constitute an essential 
facility. This, in my opinion, leaves a ray of hope for the believers in that, so 
long as the court has not ruled expressly to the contrary, it cannot be said with 
certainty that an intellectual property right cannot constitute an essential facility. 
As such, I choose to disagree with the authors when they say the following: 
‘We believe the better view is that an intellectual property right itself 
cannot constitute an essential facility, and that the doctrine should not be 
applied to cases that seek access to an intellectual property right in any but 
the most unusual of circumstances.’67      
  I am only inclined to agree with them in the latter part of the statement 
which calls for the application of the doctrine to cases that seek access to an 
intellectual property right only in the most unusual of circumstances. This 
seems to buttress my earlier point that any provisions contemplated in the 
legislation of Botswana and other developing countries must guard against 
abuse.  
                                                 
67 Ibid see note 59, at page 15 
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(b) However, it is not all doom and gloom as European Union (EU) 
case-law holds a contrary opinion as will be shown hereafter that, unlike the 
US, there is no doubt that, in the EU, a refusal to license may raise antitrust 
liability and that the doctrine of essential facilities may be applied to intellectual 
property rights. In detailing the jurisprudence in the EU, I will refer to two 
articles on the subject, one authored by Francois Leveque68 and the other, a 
report of proceedings where Rachel Brandenburger69 (a partner in a law firm in 
Brussels) made a telling contribution. Brandenburger observed that the scope of 
intellectual property rights is a matter for intellectual property law while the 
exploitation of that right is a matter for antitrust law. This ties in well with the 
earlier stated position of where and when there can be an overlap between the 
two. As to the questions of whether intellectual property rights should be treated 
differently from other property rights and whether intellectual property rights 
can be an essential facility, the learned attorney observed that both the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and the US Supreme Court have been reluctant to 
confirm or deny the essential facilities doctrine. However, Brandenburger went 
on to point out that in the EU jurisdiction, an owner of intellectual property 
rights may be required to license his right to other users where there exists 
‘exceptional circumstances’ to justify interference with the said monopolistic 
rights. This position of the law, to which Leveque agrees, was established in the 
Magill case70 and further clarified in the later case of IMS Health.71 The 
question as to what amounts to ‘exceptional circumstances’ was dealt with in 
Magill where copyrights were at stake and the blocking of a new product at the 
prejudice of consumers resulting from a refusal to license was considered, by 
the court, to be an ‘exceptional circumstance’. The importance of this condition 
was underscored in IMS Health later on.  
 
                                                 
68 Leveque Francois, Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the EU 
Microsoft case, published in the March 2005 edition of  World Competition 
69  Ibid  see note 66 
70 Cases C-241/91 P&C-242/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743, [1995] 4 CMLR 718, 
[1995] 1 CEC 400 (ECJ) 
71 Judgment of the ECJ of 29 April 2004 case C-418/01 IMS Health v. NDC Health, as yet unpublished; 
available at <http: www.curia.eu.int> 
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The court in Magill laid down the test by stating that – 
‘In order for the refusal by an undertaking which owns a copyright to give 
access to a product or service indispensable for carrying out a particular 
business to be treated as abusive, it is sufficient that three cumulative 
conditions be satisfied, vis, that the refusal is preventing the emergence of 
a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand, that it is 
unjustified and such as to exclude any competition on a secondary 
market.’72 
  The ECJ in Magill, in upholding an order by the Commission famously 
stated that- 
‘The exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor may, in exceptional 
circumstances, involve abusive conduct.’73 
  Brackenburger made an observation that, in the IMS Health case, the court 
appears to have weakened the ‘secondary market’ requirement in saying that a 
potential or hypothetical secondary market would be sufficient to satisfy the 
test. The learned attorney also made a point that she thought there was 
uncertainty regarding the ‘new product’ requirement in that the court only stated 
that the party requesting a license must not intend only to duplicate the goods or 
services already offered [this, in my view, would pose a major stumbling block 
vis-à-vis the manufacturers of generic drugs in Botswana and other developing 
countries who would be merely be seeking the right to duplicate which would 
go against this requirement]. Brackenburger points out that, beyond this 
clarification, the court did not address what a new product is, whether slight 
improvements to a product constitute a new product, or whether the new 
product must be substantially different from the existing product. This presented 




                                                 
72 Ibid  see note 70, at recital 38 of the judgment 
73 Ibid  see note 70, at recital 50 of the judgment 
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  Leveque, in addition, feels that though clarifying the picture, the decision 
in IMS Health also raises new questions concerning the scope of the Magill/IMS 
Health test. The author poses the following series of questions which he thinks 
beg to be answered – 
‘Is it [the test] specific to refusal to license copyrights? If so, what is the 
relevant test for patents? Does it [the test] address exclusively intellectual 
property rights? If so, why would the ECJ apply a different antitrust 
treatment to intellectual property from other forms of property? On the 
contrary, does it [the test] cover both tangible and non tangible essential 
facilities? If so, how are we to explain the evaluation of the ECJ towards a 
more restrictive view on the use of the essential facility doctrine?’74 
  The answer to the above questions, or an indication of a lack thereof was 
evident in the EU Microsoft case where the Commission avoided using the test 
altogether.75 I shall now turn my attention to the Microsoft case which sought to 
introduce a new test for the application of the essential facilities doctrine to 
interfere with intellectual property rights. The facts of the said case were that in 
1998 Sun Microsystems lodged a complaint with the EU Commission accusing 
Microsoft of breaching competition rules by denying it access to essential 
information on its [Microsoft’s] Windows operating system. Six years on, in the 
Commission’s decision of 24 March 2004, the Commission found Microsoft 
guilty of having infringed article 82 of the EC Treaty by refusing to supply Sun 
Microsystems and other rivals with the information they needed to offer 
compatible products.76 
                                                 
74 Ibid  see note 68, at page 6 
75 Case COMP C-3/37.792, EC Commission v. Microsoft 
76 Article 82 of the EC Treaty reads thus- 
 ‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the Common Market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may in particular consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection to the 
subject of such contracts.’ 
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  In analysing how the Commission reached its decision, both Leveque and 
Brandenburger made some interesting observation. For instance, the latter poses 
the question whether Microsoft’s refusal to provide seamless interface 
information to workgroup server rivals amounted to an exclusionary strategy or 
a simple refusal to deal? This is significant in that it will have an effect on the 
type of remedy to be ordered in the end. The learned attorney speculates that, if 
on appeal, the Commission could demonstrate that competitors had been 
prevented from developing better products than offered by Microsoft, and those 
would-be improvements were sufficient to constitute a new product, the court 
could possibly uphold the Commission’s decision as a refusal to deal. Further, 
the learned attorney asserts that, the Commission could attempt, on appeal, to 
characterize the remedy as merely the disclosure of an industry standard, in 
which case a lower threshold than that provided by the IMS/Health test would 
seem appropriate. As to whether Microsoft engaged in an exclusionary strategy 
by ceasing to provide information to competitors that it had previously made 
available to, Brandenburger says that the Commission argued that Microsoft 
changed from a competitive course of action when it (Microsoft) did not have 
its own work group server, to a non competitive one after Microsoft developed a 
competitive group server. The learned attorney goes on to state, further, that if 
the Commission’s decision relies on a theory of exclusionary strategy rather 
than a simple refusal to deal, the ramification may be that a potentially 
dominant supplier would be safer never to make information available in the 
first place. This, surely, would not be good for the competitive process. 
In his analysis of the Microsoft case, Leveque states that the Commission 
in coming to its decision followed two lines of argument in demonstrating that 
the refusal to supply is indeed abusive. Firstly, the Commission attempted to 
establish that information on interface is an essential facility. Secondly, the 
Commission advocated that Microsoft’s disruption in refusing to supply reflects 
a leveraging and foreclosure conduct. As a remedy to the abuse, the 
Commission has ordered Microsoft to give access to specifications of interface 
protocols. Leveque goes on to state that Microsoft feels that the information 
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required by Sun Microsystems is protected by several patents and such 
protection justifies its refusal to disclose, and that as a result, a compulsory 
licensing would annihilate its efforts of innovation.77 Predictably, Microsoft 
appealed the Commission’s decision before the court of First Instance which 
will not make a ruling until after about 2-3 years, and which decision would 
most likely lead to a chain of appeals instituted by the losing party. Also, 
Leveque has pointed out, there is a possibility that Microsoft and the 
Commission will settle out of court thus creating a situation whereby we would 
never know who was wrong and who was right ala the South African case of 
Hazel Tau supra. 
The two analysts (Branbenburger and Leveque) are agreed as to the fact 
that in the Microsoft case, the Commission appeared to have moved away from 
the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test by examining all the circumstances 
surrounding Microsoft’s refusal to supply rather than relying on an exhaustive 
checklist of exceptional circumstances. I am persuaded to agree with the two 
that this test is a sounder way of determining if ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
exist, to justify the intervention with an individual’s intellectual property right, 
than is the Magill/IMS Health test which, inter alia, requires that there must be 
created a ‘new product’, without determining what will constitute a new 
product. This latter test would be hard to apply, especially in the case of the 
manufacturers of generic aids drugs in developing countries who, it can be said, 
make clones of the patented drugs without adding anything that would make 
them pass the ‘new product’ requirement in the IMS Health test. It must, 
however, be noted that the reason why the Commission did not attempt to 
address the ‘new product’ conditions was because the decision in IMS Health 
was still pending when the Commission issued the decision in Microsoft. In 
moving away from the test in Magill, the Commission made a claim to the 
effect that – 
 
                                                 
77 Microsoft’s Reaction: The European Commission decision in the Microsoft Case and its Implications for 
other Companies and Industries, April 2004 <http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/legalnews> 
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‘Case-law suggests that the Commission must analyse the entirety of the 
circumstances surrounding a specific instance of refusal to supply and 
must make its decision based on the results of such a comprehensive 
examination.’78 
  Leveque states, further, that despite moving away from the test in Magill, 
the Commission is in no doubt that the Magill test is passed in the Microsoft 
case. In support of this, he cites the Commission’s argument that Microsoft’s 
refusal to supply had resulted and would continue to result in blockading new 
functions of operating systems to appear in the market. Further, he asserted, the 
Commission established that Microsoft limited technical development79 and 
exemplified80 how competitors offered new features in their products 
corresponding to consumer demand before Microsoft interrupted giving them 
information on interface. This latter fact is illustrative of the fact that Microsoft 
moved from being competitive to being anti-competitive once it had a server 
system capable of competing with those of its rivals. To me, this gives the 
antitrust authorities every right to interfere where the competitive process is 
likely to be harmed. 
  Leveque praises the Commission’s innovative step in coming up with a 
new question to test, vis, does the refusal to license reduce the incentives to 
innovate in the whole industry? In clearer terms, is the negative impact of a 
compulsory license on a dominant firm’s incentives to innovate outweighed by 
its positive impact on the innovation level of competitors? This examination is 
made by the Commission to reject Microsoft’s argument defending that its 
intellectual property is an objective justification of its behaviour. As such, a 
similar provision would have to be drafted in the Botswana legislation to follow 




                                                 
78 Ibid  see note 75, at recital 558 
79 Ibid see note 75, at recital 693-700 
80 Ibid see note 75, recital 841 and 842 
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‘In view of these exceptional circumstances [indispensability of the input, 
risk of elimination of competition and negative impact on technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers], Microsoft’s refusal to license 
cannot be objectively justified merely by the fact that it constitutes a 
refusal to license intellectual property. It is therefore necessary to assess 
whether Microsoft’s arguments regarding its incentives to innovate 
outweigh these exceptional circumstances.’81 
The Commission goes further to state that a detailed examination of the 
extent of the requested availing of information led them to the conclusion that, 
on balance, the possible negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s 
incentives to innovate is outweighed by its positive impact on the level of 
innovation of the whole industry, Microsoft included.82 Should the Court of 
First Instance uphold the Commission’s order, this will provide a valuable 
precedent for the courts in Botswana and other developing countries when 
dealing with similar issues of refusals to license. Therefore, in the case of 
pharmaceutical companies, the ‘incentives to innovate’ test would have to be 
passed for there to be intervention with an individual’s intellectual property 
rights (be it copyright or patents). In doing this, the courts will have to carry out 
a factual analysis and decide each case as it comes in a ‘rule of reason’ kind of 
way, instead of having exhaustive rules or conditions to be met in a per se kind 
of approach. For example, this process will entail the disclosure of the balance 
sheets of the pharmaceutical companies so as to see how much they have 
expended in research and development to see whether compelling them to 
disclose their secret information would, in future, deter them from engaging in 
research and development for it being too expensive as against the meagre 
possible gains caused by interference with their exploitation of their intellectual 
property rights by antitrust authorities. 
 
 
                                                 
81 Ibid see note 75, at recital 712 
82 Ibid see note 75, at recital 783 
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In his expression of his preference for the ‘incentives to innovate’ test 
established in Microsoft, Leveque based the reasons for his choice on economic 
considerations in saying that the analysis of the incentive effects to test whether 
the market will be limited to the prejudice to consumers is much more relevant. 
Firstly, he argues that incentives to innovate are a good proxy of consumers’ 
benefits and that economic theory predicts that wherever incentives are present 
firms will innovate to propose valuable improvements to consumers. 
Accordingly, he says that if firms see the opportunity to make money by 
investing in research and development, they will grab the opportunity. In 
closing this argument, Leveque says the following – 
‘…, if a refusal to license reduces the incentives to innovate, we can infer 
that the technical development will be limited to the prejudice to 
consumers.’83 
The author’s second line of argument is that the incentive effects approach 
is suited to economic theory on intellectual property where the rationale of the 
rights is to provide incentives to innovate and to overcome the free-riding 
problem. He states that each firm will find it uneconomically beneficial to 
innovate if their inventions cannot be protected from copying, by rivals, through 
intellectual property rights. This scenario, it is contended, would lead to 
innovators not recovering their investment in research and development 
resulting in innovation not being a viable exercise. However, Leveque is quick 
to point out that intellectual property can also play a debilitating role in 
hindering innovation. An example of this would be where there are different 
complimentary innovations. The author says that the problem of there being no 
relationship between , on the one hand, changes in characteristics of the product 
and, on the other hand, values and costs of innovations in terms of the new 
product condition in the Magill/IMS Health test, the incentives balance test 
proposed in Microsoft provides the solution to dispose of this problem. He 
reasons as follows- 
 
                                                 
83 Ibid  see note 68, at page 9  
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‘By definition, the antitrust order cannot be ruled if the compulsory license 
decreases the incentives of the whole industry. Therefore, where the order 
stops Firm A from investing, innovation 1 is not made and, as a result, 
innovation 2 does not emerge, neither. The incentives of the whole 
industry are lower than in the absence of compulsory licensing. The 
compulsory licensing is therefore not ordered.84  
Leveque goes on to analyse the application of the incentives balance test 
in the Microsoft case. Here, the author expresses the view that the Commission’s 
effort to achieve simplification in facilitating the demonstration of the essential 
facility doctrine is not robust. He questions whether Microsoft passes the new test 
of incentives balance. He agrees that in so far as the essential facility owner has to 
prove the existence of an objective justification, the burden of proof lies with 
Microsoft. However, he expresses doubts as to whether it is evident that 
compulsory licensing will decrease more Microsoft’s incentives to innovate than 
it will increase rivals’ incentives to innovate. Therefore, Leveque questions the 
manner in which the Commission reached its conclusion on this point. As such, a 
lesson that can be learnt for new legislation in Botswana and other developing 
countries is to try and make provision for the application of this test.  
Leveque poses the question as to whether the connection of the new test 
with the condition of objective justification is relevant in Microsoft. He argues 
that according to him, the lack of objective justification refers, in the essential 
facility doctrine, to negative external effects (giving as an example, congestion 
which the mandatory access will cause). The author argues, further, that if third 
party access to an electricity grid or to an airport disrupts the functioning of the 
facility, the increase in competition may not worth the damage it causes. In such 
instances, I am agreed with the author, it would be economically unsound to order 
the access. The above is not peculiar to intellectual property rights as evident in 
the author’s statement where he says- 
 
 
                                                 
84 Ibid  see note 68, at page 10 
 49 
 
‘However, the specific feature of intellectual property in comparison with 
other forms of property is merely the absence of capacity constraints. In 
economic jargon, intellectual property is a non-rival good. Its use by one 
agent does not reduce consumption by others.’85 
  Notwithstanding this, the author re-states his view that as a required test to 
apply the essential facility doctrine to intellectual property, the approach based 
on incentives is more economically sound than the new product condition. The 
author though proceeds to criticise the doctrine by stating that it allows antitrust 
authorities to rectify the scope of intellectual property rights. This he thinks is 
not healthy as it will bring about uncertainty on the part of inventors as they will 
not know in advance whether their rights will be whittled down or upheld by 
competition authorities. As such they will not be able to estimate the return on 
their investments accurately, which will heighten legal insecurity which would 
then result in a reduction of incentives research and development efforts. Lastly, 
the author avers that forced access may facilitate collusion between competitors. 
  Legal commentators believe that the EU Microsoft case leaves a gap for 
the essential facility doctrine to survive and that the judgment in that case 
pushes the boundaries of the test as far as it can go. 
  (c) The only South African case worth mentioning in relation to the 
essential facility doctrine which went as far as the Competition Appeals Court is 
that of Glaxo Wellcome vs. National Association of Pharmaceutical 
Wholesalers.86 
 Here, the presiding judge Hussain JA [as he then was] made the important point 
that unlike the South African Act87, neither article 82 of the EC Treaty88 nor the 
US Sherman Antitrust Act makes any express reference to the expression 
‘essential facility’. Instead, the two pieces of legislation contain provisions 
relating to the general prohibition of abuse of dominant position, and the 
essential facility doctrine, as earlier demonstrated, in both jurisdictions is the 
                                                 
85 Ibid  see note 68, at page 12 
86 Glaxo Wellcome v National Association of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers CASE NO: 15/CAC/Feb 02, can 
be accessed from the Tribunal website www.comptrib.co.za 
87 Ibid, see note 39 
88 Ibid, see note 76 
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result of judicial application of widely-framed norms directed at conduct 
amounting to the abuse of a dominant position. Thus, it would be advisable for 
Botswana and other developing countries in the process of formulating 
competition law to follow the South African example and make provision for 
the doctrine in legislation instead of leaving it to the whim of the courts to 
interpret and administer without any legislative guidance. 
  Before going into an analysis of the case, it is paramount to state that the 
case did not involve the application of the essential facility doctrine to 
intellectual property and the question of whether intellectual property can be an 
essential facility. Instead, what was in dispute was whether scarce goods or 
products could be an essential facility, a question which the court answered in 
the negative as will hereafter be demonstrated. In Glaxo Wellcome, the 
complainants were pharmaceutical wholesalers and distributors while the 
respondents were manufacturers of pharmaceutical products, a great deal of 
which were sold and distributed by the complainants. The gravamen of the 
complaint related to the conversion by the respondents of a company cited as 
the 8th respondent [Druggists Distributors-DD] from a wholesaler to a 
distribution agent on behalf of the respondent. This action resulted in the 
complainants continuing to supply the large volumes of the complainants’ 
products except that the respondents stopped offering the complainants a 
discount of 17.5 per cent as was the custom. The complainants therefore 
objected to the respondents’ decision to set up the distribution agent and sought 
relief against the respondents through the Act alleging that the latter had 
engaged in conduct prohibited by sections 4, 5, 8, and 9 of the Act.89 The 
learned judge states that the complainants, in their referral, alleged conduct, on 




                                                 
89 The said provisions proscribe conduct amounting to restrictive horizontal practices, restrictive vertical 
practices, abuse of dominance, and price discrimination by dominant firms 
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  ‘(a)  denial of access to an essential facility; 
(b) the charging of excessive prices; and 
(c) predatory pricing.’90 
    I shall confine myself to the allegation in (a) above, vis, the one of denial 
of access to an essential facility in accordance with s8(b) of the Act.91 The 
learned judge observed that according to the complainants, the respondents’ 
product constituted resources that could not reasonably be duplicated in 
accordance with the definition of the term in the Act.92 In the learned judge’s 
opinion, it is clear that the provisions of the Act do not support such an 
interpretation as ‘resource’ was not meant to be interpreted as products, goods 
or services. As such, the learned judge was not persuaded by the complainants’ 
argument that pharmaceutical products qualify as essential facilities and 
resources for anti-trust purposes.  
The learned judge is of the view, further, that the tribunal’s approach 
together with the wrong interpretation relied upon by the complainants 
effectively gives s8(b) a wide meaning which broadens the scope of the said 
provision well beyond what was intended by the legislature. He is adamant in 
his understanding that the legislature intended, from the clear architecture of the 
Act, that there should be limits to the essential facility doctrine. The learned 
judge reasons that granting access to a dominant firm’s facilities is a substantial 
intervention on the part of competition authorities and as such, widening the 
application and scope of the essential facilities doctrine can have harmful 
economic effects such as discouraging investment in infrastructure. This, the 
learned judge says, might lead to a scenario where investors will be reluctant to 
invest for fear of a third party demanding a ‘free ride’ on the fruits of such 
investment. The learned judge points out that the myriad of available decided 
cases do not favour a wide interpretation and application of the doctrine.  
                                                 
90 Ibid see  note 86,  para [10] at page 7 of the judgement 
91 Section 8(b) of the South African Competition Act Reads: ‘It is prohibited for a dominant firm to – 
(b) refuse to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is economically feasible to do so;’ 
92 Section 1(1)(viii) defines essential facility as ‘means an infrastructure or resource that cannot reasonably 




This led the court to hold as follows: 
‘Thus, whilst it is unnecessary, for purposes of this judgment, to define the 
ambit of section 8(b), I find that section 8(b) does not prohibit the conduct 
of refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor. For reasons already 
stated, the phrase ‘refuse to give a competitor access to an essential 
facility’ does not mean ‘refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor’, 
‘nor is section 8(b) a species of some more general refusal to deal (sic).’93 
  The court went on to state that for one to allege a contravention of s8(b), 
they will have to aver, in their complaint, that: 
‘1. the dominant firm concerned refuses to give the complainant 
access to an infrastructure or a resource;  
2. the complainant and the dominant firm are competitors; 
3. the infrastructure or resource concerned cannot reasonably be 
duplicated; 
4. the complainant cannot reasonably provide goods or services to its 
competitors without access to the infrastructure or resource; and 
5. it is economically feasible for the dominant firm to provide its 
competitors with access to the infrastructure or resource.’94 
The court found that the complainants failed to fulfil the above 
requirements in their complaint so as to justify an order compelling the 
respondents to make available to the complainants the facility in question. 
 In the case of a developing country like Botswana, vis a vis the 
declaring of patented information of pharmaceutical companies which 
manufacture aids drugs, it will be very difficult to make use of a similar 
provision to the South African s8(b) to compel the pharmaceuticals to 
disclose information as there are no companies [generic drug 
manufacturers] operating in Botswana who can be said to be competitors 
of the pharmaceutical companies holding patents to aids drugs. It will, 
therefore, be very difficult to make the competition laws pertaining to the 
                                                 
93 Ibid see note 86, para [56] at page 31 of the judgment 
94 Ibid see note 86, para 57 at pages 31 and 32 of the judgment 
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essential facilities doctrine to work towards making aids drugs available 
and affordable to the general populace. Issues of capacity constraints here 
would apply in the same way as they have prevented Botswana and other 
developing countries to utilize the flexibilities of the WTO TRIPs 
agreement relating to compulsory licensing.95  
  
(iii) Excessive Pricing to the Detriment of Consumers 
 The other prohibited practice which I would like to deal with as arising 
from the South African case of Hazel Tau is that of excessive pricing. The 
Commission found that GSK and BI were guilty of the prohibited practice of 
excessive pricing in accordance with s8(a) of the South African Act.96 This I 
would like to approach from the angle of how far would a similar provision, in 
the proposed Botswana legislation, go towards curtailing or controlling the 
conduct of the pharmaceutical companies from charging exorbitant and 
unreasonable prices for their medicines. I will attempt to do this by looking at 
the available decided cases in the EU and South Africa. In her work, Eleanor 
Fox, a commentator on the area of competition law and policy, addressed the 
issue of ‘abuse of a dominant position’ at great length.97 Just like in South 
Africa, in the EU, before one can be found guilty of abusive conduct such as 
excessive pricing, they have to meet the prerequisites of being dominant and 
pass the market definition test. Section 7 of the South African Act98 defines 
what a dominant firm is by referring to a particular market and market power 
which itself is defined at s1 of the Act99. Fox cites the case of Hoffman-La 
Roche
100
 where the European Court of Justice defined ‘dominant position’ that 
is prohibited by article 82 of the EC Treaty in the following terms: 
                                                 
95 Ibid see note 15 
96 Ibid  see note 46 
97 Eleanor Fox, Competition Policy, at Chapter 22 of same on ‘Abuse of a Dominant Position’, available 
from the 2006 Course Outline for the UCT LLM Competition Law class of Judge D Davis 
98 Ibid  see note 47 
99 Section 1(1)(xiv) reads – 
‘“market power” means the power of a firm to control prices, or to exclude competition or to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers or suppliers; .…’ 
100 Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] ECR 461 
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‘The dominant position … referred to [in article 86 which is now article 
82] relates to economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables 
it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market 
by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently 
of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers.’ 
The similarities with the South African legislation are apparent from the 
on-set and it would be advisable for Botswana to incorporate similar provisions 
in her proposed new legislation. The author attempted to break down the court’s 
statement into individual components by stating that a ‘dominant position’ 
connotes economic power in a market, power to impose market terms on 
competitors, or more generally power to hinder the maintenance of effective 
competition. Fox proceeds to conclude that for legal purposes, dominance may 
be inferred from a large market share where the next largest firm is half the size 
of the largest firm or less. In Hoffman-La Roche101, a 47 per cent share of the 
market for Vitamin A was held to be enough to confer dominance in view of the 
structure of the market (the next largest competitors had 27 per cent and 18 per 
cent respectively), Roche’s technological lead over its competitors, the absence 
of potential competition, and Roche’s overcapacity. From the above, it is 
mandatory that there must be a definition of the relevant market for the abuse of 
dominant position to be proved. In relation to this, Fox points out that if a firm 
is dominant, it is dominant within a defined market, and as such market 
definition, that is, the determination of both the product market and the 
geographic market, must precede a determination of dominance.  
From this it is clear that, in the case of the pharmaceutical companies and 
aids drugs, there will have to be defined a market and the dominance of the 
firms in that market looking at the share of the market they would have. This is 
a tedious and expensive process, and in the absence of the requisite structures 
for investigating, such as the Competition Commission in the case of South 
Africa, it will be very difficult for Botswana and other developing countries 
without the necessary capacity to carry out these functions. Thus, as has been 
                                                 
101 Ibid  see note 70 
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suggested in different fora, it would be wise for Botswana and other small 
countries in the region to come together and cooperate on such issues. For 
example, a proposal can be made to have a trans-national authority within the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU)102, for instance, whose expenses 
could be shared amongst member states.  
In dealing with ‘abusive conduct’, Fox poses the question: what does it 
mean to “abuse” a dominant position? In attempting to provide answers to this 
question, she offers her own interpretation of article 82 of the EC Treaty. She 
points out that the said provision of the Treaty lists four particular courses of 
conduct that may be abusive amongst which is conduct that is directly 
associated with the existence of market power and is often referred to as 
exploitative in that it represents the use of power over price to extract more than 
‘fair’ or ‘competitive’ prices from customers. She cites as examples of such 
conduct, the imposition of unfair prices and limiting production.  
(a) Fox then cites two EU cases where the allegations of firms having 
engaged in the abusive conduct of excessive pricing succeeded in the one and 
failed in the other. 
The first is the case of British Leyland 103where British Leyland (BL) was 
a toll-taker enabled by government license and given the exclusive right to 
determine whether imported BL cars conformed to UK national standards, and 
to issue certificates of conformity. BL arbitrarily refused to grant certain 
certificates to applicants and it set much higher fees for left-hand-drive cars. 
The court here adopted the test initiated in the earlier case of General Motors 
where the court held that an undertaking abuses its dominant position where it 
has an administrative monopoly and charges for its services fees which are 
disproportionate to the economic value of the service provided. 
The court in British Leyland took into consideration the fact that the 
verification process did not require an inspection of the vehicle and that it was 
carried out on the basis of a certificate furnished by a garage. The court was of 
                                                 
102 The Southern African Customs Union is made up of Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, and 
Swaziland and was established by agreement of the year 2000 
103 British Leyland v. Commission Case 226/84 [1986] ECR 3236 
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the view that, as such, on the basis of cost incurred, the whole process did not 
justify the charging of different fees for the issue of certificates of conformity 
according to whether the vehicles were right-hand-drive or left-hand-drive. The 
court was of the view that the differences in the fees was solely for the purpose 
of making the re-importation of left-hand-drive vehicles less attractive. In the 
circumstances, the court held that the Commission was entitled to conclude that 
the fee was fixed at a level which was clearly disproportionate to the economic 
value of the service provided and that the practice constituted an abuse by BL of 
the monopoly it held by virtue of the British rules. As such, the court held that 
the complaints made by the Commission in the contested decision were 
established. 
The second case is that of United Brands104 where United Brands was the 
biggest producer of bananas in the EU. It was a vertically integrated company 
that grew bananas in South America, bought from other growers half of the 
bananas it sold, and accounted for some 40 per cent of the sales of bananas in 
the EU, which was more than twice that of its nearest rival. The Commission 
alleged a series of abuses against United Brands, including the cut-off of a 
Danish ripener-distributor, excessive pricing and discriminatory pricing. I will 
confine myself to the findings of the court pertaining to the allegation of 
excessive pricing. The evidence adduced showed that United Brand’s prices 
were approximately 7 per cent higher than the prices of its nearest rivals, and 
they were 30 per cent to 40 per cent higher than that of unbranded bananas. The 
Commission had found discriminatory and excessive pricing violations and 
ordered United Brands to reduce its prices to distributors other than the 
distributors for Ireland [where the price was lower by as much as 100 per cent] 





                                                 
104 United Brands Co. v. Commission Case 27/76 [1978] ECR 207 
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The court stated the test for determining excessive pricing as follows – 
‘The questions … to be determined are whether the difference between the 
costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, and, if 
the answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether a price has been 
imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to competitor 
products.’105     
The court acknowledges that the Commission had based its finding that 
the prices charged by United Brands were excessive on an analysis of the 
differences between the prices charged in the different member states of the EU 
and on the policy of discriminatory prices vis the low prices charged in Ireland 
as against the price charged in other member states. The court states that the 
foundation of the Commission’s argument was the letter in which United 
Brands acknowledged that the margin allowed by the sale of bananas to Irish 
ripeners was much smaller than in some other EU member states and it 
concluded from this that the amount by which the actual prices in, for example, 
Holland, exceeded the delivered Rotterdam prices for bananas to be sold to Irish 
customers in Dublin must represent a profit of the same order of magnitude. 
The court pointed out, nevertheless, that the Commission had not taken 
into account, in its reasoning, several of United Brands’ letters in which were 
enclosed a confidential document retracting what it had said in its earlier letter 
and pointing out that the prices charged in Ireland had produced a loss. The 
court stated that, however unreliable the particulars supplied by United Brands 
in subsequent letters may be, the onus of proving that United Brands had 
charged excessively remained with the Commission. The court was of the view, 
further, that the Commission had not effectively refuted United Brands’ 
retraction which all established doubt that the basis for the calculation adopted 
by the Commission to prove that United Brands’ prices were excessive is open 
to criticism, and that on this particular point there was doubt which must benefit 
United Brands, especially [in the eyes of the court] as for nearly 20 years 
banana prices had, in real terms, not risen on the relevant market. 
                                                 
105 Ibid  see note 104, at para 252 
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In the circumstances, the court held that the Commission had not adduced 
adequate legal proof of the facts and evaluations which formed the gravamen of 
its finding that United Brands had infringed article 86 [now article 82] of the 
Treaty by directly and indirectly imposing unfair selling prices for bananas. 
It is clear from the two cases that in the case of Botswana and the 
pharmaceutical companies manufacturing aids drugs, at a time when 
competition legislation is in place, where one alleges excessive and unfair 
pricing by the pharmaceutical companies, they would have to satisfy the test 
indicated in the two cases. This would be a tedious and expensive exercise 
which would require the authorities to be equipped with capacity both in the 
form of economic expertise and financial resources to enable it to carry out the 
requisite investigations. This being so in that they would have to show that the 
pharmaceutical companies are charging prices which are disproportionate to the 
economic value their product as per British Leyland106, or that looking at the 
costs of production incurred by the companies, the profits they are making are 
excessive and that the price is in itself unfair or as compared to competitor 
products as per United Brands107.  
Reyburn108 is of the further view that cost-price and profitability should 
not be made in isolation and that an examination of other characteristics of the 
market may provide a reasonable explanation of the high price. He cites here 
that in an instance where a firm engages in activities with significant ex ante 
risks or investment in research and development, the difference between price 
and unit cost of production may reflect the up-front investment and the 
comparative rewards of innovation. However, he goes on to state, in quoting 
Napp Pharmaceuticals,109 that ex ante investment is not a reasonable 
justification where such investment has long been recouped, and that the 
argument that a firm should be allowed supra-normal profits on one product to 
fund research and development on risky new products has been rejected in at 
                                                 
106 Ibid  see note 103 
107 Ibid  see note 104 
108 Ibid see note 38 at 7-37 
109 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v Director General of Fair Trading UK Competition Appeal 
Tribunal 2002-01-15 Case No 1001/1/1/01 at paras 407, 416-418 
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least one case.110 
All this will entail the Commission knowing the prices charged by the 
companies and those of their competitors [being the manufacturers of generic 
drugs], and also the costs of production which can only be obtained from the 
companies upon the court requesting disclosure from them of such things as 
balance sheets and other confidential documents. The earlier argument about 
cooperation applies here, and Botswana would do well to learn from other 
countries where the area of competition law is more developed [such as South 
Africa] and seek assistance in the form of technology transfer and training on 
the workings of competition authorities. As such, this would present a great 
opportunity to deal with those companies seeking to maximise profits by 
exploiting consumers and abusing their dominant position in the relevant 
market.  
(b) Fox states that US antitrust law does not prohibit excessive 
pricing and that it prohibits price discrimination but only if the discriminatory 
pricing is likely to produce monopoly or hurt disfavoured buyers in their 
competition with favoured ones. This is not the example for Botswana to follow 
in her competition law as [I think] the US model is better suited to developed 
economies such as theirs where free enterprise is the order of the day. If 
Botswana were to follow the US example, it would lead to a situation where in 
the case of the pharmaceutical companies and aids drugs, the companies would 
be given a free hand in determining prices with no checks and balances in place 
to regulate them. I think this explains why, as Fox points out, virtually all the 
post-communist, newly free-enterprise economies adopt the EC model and not 






                                                 
110 Ibid  see note 109 at para 413 
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Fox states that the US position on excessive pricing was underscored by 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Berkey/Kodak111 where the court 
stated the following: 
‘Excessive prices, maintained through exercise of a monopolist’s control 
of the market, constituted one of the primary evils that the Sherman Act 
was intended to correct … 
But unless the monopoly has bolstered its power by wrongful actions, it 
will not be required to pay damages merely because its prices may later be 
found excessive. Setting a high price may be a use of monopoly power, 
but it is not in itself anticompetitive. Indeed, although a monopolist may 
be expected to charge a somewhat higher price than would prevail in a 
competitive market, there is probably no better way to guarantee that its 
dominance will be challenged than by greedily extracting the highest price 
it can … judicial oversight of pricing policies would place the courts in a 
role akin to that of a public regulatory commission ….  
We would be wise to decline that function unless Congress clearly 
bestows it upon us.’112 
  Notwithstanding the above, Fox avers that legislators and enforcement 
agencies in the US do react when private firms have enormous power and 
exploit the public. The author cites as an example, where in the wake of the 
1990 oil shock, the state of Pennsylvania passed excessive pricing laws; the 
National Association of [State] Attorneys General developed a plan to support 
anti-price gouging legislation; and the Department of Justice opened an 
investigation to determine whether the sudden sharp increases in the price of 
gasoline were collusive. She also mentions that the exorbitant prices of aids 
drugs have led to what she terms ‘public uproar, jawboning, and “voluntary” 
price reductions’. But one may argue that this does not have the force of law 
and as such a more permanent and compelling mechanism has to be in place a 
la the EC Treaty provisions on excessive pricing.   
                                                 
111 Berkey Photo Inc. v Eastmen Kodak Co., 603 F. 2d 263, 294 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093, 
100 S.Ct. 1061, 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980) 
112 Ibid see note 111 
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(c) The position currently in South Africa is that there is no case law on 
excessive pricing and in Glaxo Wellcome,113 the one case in which a ruling 
could have been made on the issue, it was struck out for procedural irregularity 
after preliminary arguments were raised thus preventing the court from dealing 
with the merits relating to the allegation of a breach of s8(a) of the Act dealing 
with excessive pricing.  
However, there seems to be light at the end of the tunnel in that the case of 
Sasol v Omnia Fertilizer Ltd
114
 might just present the court with the opportunity 
to make a ruling on the issue of excessive pricing. In this case the complainant 
(Omnia) had submitted a complaint to the Commission alleging, inter alia, that 
Sasol had violated s8(a) of the Act in that its prices were excessive. At first, the 
Commission decided not to refer the matter to the Tribunal citing a lack of 
sufficient evidence to back up the complaint. Instead of proceeding on its own 
to the Tribunal based on the non-referral by the Commission, the complainant 
chose rather to go and gather new facts which were more extensive and dealt in 
part with events that had occurred after the filing of the first complaint. The 
Commission investigated this new complaint and referred it to the Tribunal. 
Sasol sought to challenge the validity of this referral of the new complaint 
arguing that the Commission had previously rejected the complaint and as such 
was functus officio, at the same time seeking to plead res judicata in that the 
matter had been dealt with. The court held that there are no provisions in the 
Act preventing the Commission from reconsidering a prior decision unless it 
does so for an ulterior motive. These had not been pleaded by Sasol, and the 
court had no reason to find that the Commission had acted out of an ulterior 
motive in referring the second complaint to the Tribunal. The court held, 
further, that if new facts are placed before the Commission or if new facts come 
to light which were not previously known to the Commission, it is enjoined to 
investigate the complaint in order to properly fulfil its statutory function as the 
primary body responsible for prosecuting any conduct which is alleged to be 
                                                 
113 Ibid see note 86 
114 Sasol Chemical Industries v Competition Commission, Omnia Fertilizer Limited and Others Case 
52/CAC/Jun 05; judgment delivered on 28 April 2006 
 62 
 
prohibited by the Act. The court stated that there are two circumstances where 
the Commission would be precluded from making a referral vis where the issue 
had previously been determined by the Tribunal or where in consequence of the 
Commission’s refusal to prosecute a complaint, the complainant itself is 
prosecuting the complaint. Neither of these applied to the present case and as 
such the court dismissed Sasol’s applications. 
With the technical issues out of the way it is hoped that the court will 
proceed to hear the arguments on the merits and make a ruling on the issue of 
excessive pricing, in the process setting a precedent of South African case law. 
[I submit, however, that all efforts to find out how far the case was and if the 
complainant had decided to go all the way to court for the determination of the 
allegations it has levelled against Sasol proved futile] 
Reyburn throws in his bit by stating that the South African prohibition of 
excessive pricing at s8(a) follows the more regulatory approach of the EC. He, 
however, says that the application of the provision is quite difficult where he 
says the following: 
‘…[b]ut even in the EC, aside from a series of cases in the area of 
telecommunications, dominant firms have not been commonly charged 
with, or found liable for, excessive pricing. This may be explained in part 
by the difficulty of determining when a price is excessive and an 
understandable reticence on the part of competition authorities to become 
price regulators.’115 
Thus, any complainant in Botswana would have their work cut out in 
trying to prove prohibited conduct by the pharmaceutical companies pursuant to 
the provision in the proposed Botswana legislation, that would be the equivalent 
of the South African s8(a) on excessive pricing. 
The author goes on to raise an important point that the South African 
courts and commentators have thus far referred to excessive pricing as a ‘per se 
offence’. He says that the above is not true and can be misleading, in so far as it 
seeks to portray the view that a complainant under s8(a) of the South African 
                                                 
115 Ibid see note 38, at 7-36 
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Act need not prove that the excessive pricing conduct has some detrimental 
effect on consumers. He says that the correct position is that the complainant 
must prove that the conduct has an effect and the nature of the effect is 
specifically that the pricing must be to ‘the detriment of consumers’. This 
phrase or concept, the author concedes, is a peculiarly South African invention 
which has no equivalent in EC law. This further requirement would serve only 
to increase the burden on a complainant in Botswana vis-à-vis proving excessive 
pricing conduct, therefore, making it even more difficult to prove. As such, a lot 
of time must go into deciding whether, on this point, the proposed Botswana 
























  CONCLUSION 
 This paper has demonstrated the lengths that both the WTO multilateral 
trading system and competition law and policy can go in delivering AIDS drugs 
to the people in developing countries, and their shortcomings. I would like, in 
closing, to make the following few points: 
(a) the Director-General of the WTO [Pascal Lamy] feels that the agreed 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement is the ideal way forward as it 
confirms the members’ determination to ensure that the system 
contributes to the humanitarian and development goals of the 
organisation; 
(b)  on the same victory trail, Amina Mohamad [Kenyan Ambassador and 
Chair of the WTO General Council] says that the benefits of the 
amendment is to ensure that African nations and the rest of the 
developing world have access to affordable medicines and that they 
are able to drive the price of drugs to even lower levels; 
[The above views seem to suggest a high confidence in the eventual 
working of the system and call for a bit more patience with the system 
so that we can see the fruits later on] 
(c) those who harbour a contrary view to the ‘victory’ celebrations, such 
as Ellen ‘t Hoen [the coordinator of one of the projects for Medicines 
without Frontiers], feel that until the good that is on paper is 
transformed into tangible success that will deliver medicines to the 
people, there is no cause for celebration; 
(d) there are also those who feel that for the system to work and benefit 
developing countries, diplomatic efforts must be taken to ensure that 
countries such as the US desist from using economic threats to exert 
pressure on developing countries to refrain from using the flexibilities 
in the TRIPS Agreement to issue compulsory licenses over patented 
medicines. They cite the example of FTAs which the US seeks to 
conclude with many developing countries, and which impose stringent 
TRIPS-plus requirements on the smaller countries; 
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(e) a recommendation was made earlier by Adede supra where he said 
that African countries should look into passing appropriate national 
legislation that will enable them to take advantage of compulsory 
licensing or parallel importation, together with antitrust laws that 
would ensure that the competitive process is preserved; 
(f) there has also been a call for there to be lee-way for allowing 
competition authorities to act in the preservation of life as a matter of 
public policy so as to justify the competition authorities interfering 
with patent-owners rights in appropriate circumstances; 
(g) regarding the ‘essential facility’ doctrine, EU law has left the door 
open that intellectual property can constitute an essential facility such 
that one may be ordered, by a court, to make such facility available to 
his competitors; 
(h) in coming up with competition legislation, it would be wise for 
Botswana and other developing countries to adopt the more regulatory 
model of the EU and South Africa, unlike the US which has left a lot 
to the whims of the courts; and 
(i) for the sound implementation of competition legislation there has to be 
structures [in the form of authorities like the Commission, the 
Tribunal, and the Competition Appeals Court as in South Africa] in 
place. On this note, Botswana can learn from South Africa and other 
countries and try to tailor her system in accordance with her resources 
and objectives. Also, Botswana can seek cooperation with other 
developing countries in the region to coordinate the functioning of 
competition authorities and to jointly finance same.     
All in all, I submit that a balance should be struck between competition 
law and the multilateral trading system of the WTO in attempting to make 
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